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ABSTRACT 
This research is based on pre-existing data gathered by researchers Kevin Jack Riley and 
Bruce Hoffman and provided by the National Institute of Justice. The study surveyed both state 
and local agencies in order to obtain information on domestic terrorism preparedness. Four 
research questions were addressed involving general characteristics of agencies, terrorism threat 
assessment, terrorism risk assessment, and terrorist threat on environment. Each question was 
analyzed thoroughly, and as a result a final summary of the findings was established showing that 
local and state law enforcement agencies and jurisdictions are not adequately prepared for 
domestic terrorist attacks inside U.S. borders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Domestic terrorism is a different breed of terrorism. It directly impacts the United States 
and its citizens. According to the U.S. Department of Justice in its 1996 publication Terrorism in 
the United States, domestic terrorism is defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as 
involving "groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and 
Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose violent acts are directed at elements of the U.S. 
Government or population" (U.S. Department of Justice 1996: 3). This definition clearly states 
that the act of domestic terrorism is by Americans, against Americans, and on American soil. 
One hundred and sixty-five (domestic) terrorist incidents took place between 1982-1992 (Lewis 
1999). 
With such events occurring, our state and local officials must be prepared. The 
government is said to be using five tactics in fighting domestic terrorism. These means are 
"diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, military options, and law enforcement action" (U.S. 
Department of Justice 1996: 19). The main focus is on law enforcement action. What forms of 
action are to be used and are used by state and local agencies is of major concern. Of those 
agencies prepared, where is the education coming from and how well prepared are these local 
agencies? 
EXAMPLES OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
On October 21, 1910, the Los Angeles Times Building was blown up by labor terrorists. 
The 1920's made way for the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan and the rise of gangsters. Nazi's and 
swastikas came to fame in the 1930' s, as did the "Mad Bomber" in the 1940' s. All of these 
people and events later paved the way for those such as Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber, 
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-Theodore Kaczynski, in the 1990' s. (Nash 1998). The 1990' s were a time of terrorist growth. 
Militias have become common. Along with militias, right-wing and special-interest groups have 
become an increasing concern to agencies, according to a study by Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce 
Hoffman (Riley and Hoffman 1995). 
White supremacist groups rose in popularity and became much better known. One white 
supremacy "hero," Randy Weaver, surrendered to federal agents on August 31, 1992, after his 
wife and son were both gunned down. Weaver was defiant of gun laws and a fugitive on gun 
charges (Nash 1998). These deaths not only angered white supremacists but also heightened the 
rage and hatred felt by them against the government. We, as a country, would nevertheless "pay" 
for our actions. 
Along with the killing of Randy Weaver's family, the attack on the Branch Davidian cult 
by federal agents stirred up more hatred toward the government. America would later feel the 
wrath of Timothy McVeigh, who stood back and watched as the compound in Waco, Texas, 
went up in flames leaving cult leader David Koresh and seventy-two of his followers dead (Nash 
1998). This federal siege was a fifty-one day affair ending on April 19, 1993. 
It would not be until exactly two years later that all of America felt the effects of the 
Oklahoma City bombing. This was the worst act of terrorism ever in America. The truck bomb 
killed 168 men, women and children. The nine story Murrah Federal Building was left partially 
standing. Although McVeigh would receive a death sentence two years later, the nation 
remained devastated. 
Also during the 1990' s the mystery of the Unabomber plagued the nation. His specialty 
was the package bomb. On September 19, 1995, the Washington Post published his thirty-five 
",- thousand word manifesto which was recognized by David Kaczynski as his brother's (Theodore 
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Kaczynski) writing. Kaczynski was later arrested and found guilty of acts of terrorism (Nash 
1998). 
Additional terrorist acts have disrupted our nation during the past decade. On July 27, 
1996, a 911 call was received giving only a twenty-minute bomb warning. Officials were too 
late and at 1 :20 A.M. a pipe bomb injured 112 people and left one woman dead at Centennial 
Olympic Park. A cameraman also lost his life to a heart attack as a result of the explosion (U.S. 
Department of Justice 1996). The Summer Olympics of 1996 was the largest in history, making 
it a terrorist's dream for attack. 
DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS 
Radical groups have also done great damage. Abortion clinics in both Alabama and 
Atlanta were bombed causing injury and death (Nash 1998). Such radicals are not ordinary 
protestors. They use violence and other criminal means to force their views onto others. 
Radicals fight for animal rights, against abortion and even for environmental issues, but do so in 
a violent manner. This factor is what separates them from peaceful protest. They are also 
separated from other terrorists due to seeking out resolutions, whereas those such as Timothy 
McVeigh and the Unabomber sought "widespread political changes" (U.S. Department of Justice 
1996: 18). 
The threat of terrorism within the United States has placed increased pressure on law 
enforcement agencies. How well prepared are these agencies and what type of training is 
actually available to them? These questions are becoming a greater concern than what they were 
twenty years ago. Terrorism is not something that only occurs at the airport or on a highjacked 
plane. Groups of citizens within the boundaries of this country have grown to despise their 
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government, and are now taking it upon themselves to defeat it. The rise of "militia groups" and 
terrorists has become an increasing concern over the past decade. 
Militia groups, or the patriot movement, has been a rising force in recent years. Members 
believe that the government is violating their constitutional rights. In tum, these individuals have 
grown to hate the u.s. Government. Four beliefs or philosophies found in militia members are 
as follows: "(1) an obsessive suspicion of the government; (2) a belief in anti-government 
conspiracy theories; (3) a deep-seated hatred of government official; and (4) a feeling that the 
United States Constitution, for all intents and purposes, has been discarded by Washington 
bureaucrats" (Snow1999: 26). These are the beliefs behind such acts as the Oklahoma City 
Bombing. According to Joe Roy of Klanwatch, "militias operating in the United States today 
are breeding grounds for the kind of fanaticism behind the Oklahoma City bombing" (Snow 
1999: 102). 
These individuals are a threat to every citizen in this country. They do not care who is 
hurt as long as their point gets across. One member is quoted as saying that "God won't be mad 
at us if we drop four or five buildings. He will probably reward us" (Snow 1999: 25). This is 
just on example of the irrational logic behind such groups. It may even begin to explain why 
McVeigh could bomb a building filled with so many innocent people, including children. Not 
only do such individuals have irrational thoughts, but they also receive paramilitary training. 
This is one more warning to agencies that these individuals are ready for war. 
With this growing concern of militia groups and terrorist attacks within our country, one 
must ask if we are prepared to respond to such threats. If we are prepared, how well prepared are 
we? Do agencies have the proper training and equipment? What about working relationships? 
Do agencies (federal, state, and local) work together toward a common goal? These are all 
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questions that need answers. One study containing such answers, Domestic Terrorism: A 
National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness, was a 24-month long process of gathering 
this information. 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
Terrorism has a new face. Contemporary terrorists blend well within the United States 
population. Those responsible for bombing, attacks and killings do not participate in midnight 
rides associated with the original Ku Klux Klan. Instead they plot and plan. They wait for their 
opportunity and hide in the shadows of others, such as Timothy McVeigh. Threats of chemical 
and biological attacks are taking precedence over highjackings and hostage situations. This has 
made it difficult for officials to pinpoint particular individuals and to respond to contemporary 
threats. Added to this reality is a dual reality that America is an extremely open and free society. 
Thereby, terrorists can move freely among the population. 
Along with the difficulty of identify those responsible for terrorist actions, tactics and 
weapons used by domestic terrorists are ever changing. The threat of biological and chemical 
warfare have heightened. According to Chris Seiple in his 1997 article in Parameters journal, it 
is vital that first responders know what to do in different situations. Seiple states that there is a 
"golden hour" after a chemical attack, in which the outcome can be determined. Individuals 
must be decontaminated and sent to the hospital. The "golden hour" is crucial to victim survival. 
After the hour, and if nothing has been done to help the victims, they will not survive (Seiple 
1997). 
Seiple goes on to discuss biological warfare and its contrast from chemical warfare. In 
dealing with biological warfare those who have been exposed must be isolated from others. The 
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illness must be quarantined, which can be difficult considering symptoms may not show for a 
few days. The idea of quarantining victims is an impossible option at this time (Seiple 1997). 
The govemment has continued to rectify this, as well as identifying cyber threats. John F. 
Lewis, author of the article "Fighting Terrorism in the 21 5t Century", discusses briefly the FBI's 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The NIPC is working to fight "new age 
terrorist warfare." Being able to identify cyber threats and incidents has allowed the center to 
prevent attacks on information systems (Lewis 1999). 
Because of the government's ability to successfully counter terrorist acts, such as hostage 
situations, this has caused warfare to change and become even more deadly, according to Jeff 
Beatty, chief executive officer of Total Security Services International (Begert 1998). Terrorists 
want to cause major damage, in which the government cannot interfere. This is where the idea of 
chemical and biological warfare are born. 
Chemical warfare is dangerous. Beatty says that, "chemical weapons were developed for 
total war - kill, injure or seriously incapacitate human beings, period" (Begert 1998: 38). The 
Economist article "The New Terrorism: Coming soon to a city near you" agrees that chemical 
warfare is serious, but believes that biological warfare is a much greater concern. The author 
states that chemical warfare requires the accumulation of large amounts of material to produce 
destructive weapons. This would be difficult without attracting attention, whereas the author 
notes that "[W]ith germ warfare, tiny quantities could be enough to inflict tens of thousands of 
casualties (The New Terrorism 1998: 18). Also, victims of chemical warfare will likely know 
that they have been a victim, whereas victims of biological warfare may not realize what has 
happened. Biological agent victims many not feel the effects for days, and could contaminate 
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-hundreds of other people (The New Terrorism 1998). The new terrorism may seem quieter, but 
the effects can be louder than any bomb. 
Studies have shown that terrorist incidents have declined, but their fatalities have 
drastically increased. The year of 1996 left 510 individuals dead due to international terrorist 
incidents, although 1996 had the least amount of terrorist incidents since 1991 (Lesser et al. 
1999). One must ask why terrorist acts have become more lethal. Timothy McVeigh could 
possibly have answered this question after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. 
McVeigh stated that by not killing "it would not have gotten the point across. We needed a body 
count to make our point" (Lesser et al. 1999: 13). 
The killing of 168 innocent people did get the point across to this country, but what can 
be done? How can our state, local, and federal agencies prepare for such incidents when 
terrorists are becoming quieter and better at doing their job? Attempts have been made to answer 
these questions at all levels of government, state, local, and federal. 
One way to deter and respond to terrorist acts is through special units. The Los Angeles 
County's Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) has three specific functions. Deputy John 
Sullivan of the L.A. County Sheriff s Department says the "TEW scans for potential threats, 
monitors specific trends and forecasts the likely course of events for the incident commander 
during and actual incident." He goes on to say that, "it also serves as a mechanism for educating 
key responders, investigators and decision-makers about the dynamics of a specific threat of 
terrorist attack" (Begert 1998: 39). The unit is made up of law enforcement personnel, fire 
fighters, medical and public health individuals, as well as persons possessing counter-terrorism 
expertise (Begert 1998). 
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-Because domestic terrorism impacts local and state jurisdictions, such agencies will more 
than likely be the first responders. Douglas Bodrero, author of the article "Confronting 
Terrorism on the State and Local Level," brings to the reader's attention that a plan or process to 
address terrorist threat must be developed. Bodrero states that, first and foremost, agencies at the 
local level must be able to "recognize a domestic terrorism threat." They "should develop a state 
of readiness to prevent, deter, and interdict terrorist attacks" (Bodrero 1999: 14). 
Planning is said to be the key, but training must come first. Bodrero states that training 
since 1995 is centered on first response and preparation, but what is actually needed is prevention 
training. While a simple principle, if an incident can be prevented, a response to an act would 
not be necessary. Also, if an act could be prevented injuries could be avoided, and lives saved. 
In order for this type of training to occur, agencies need the equipment and funds to move 
forward. The federal government is an important source of funding and information. In 1996, 
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which assigned the 
National Institute of Justice (NIl) of discovering what technologies local and state agencies, 
needed. Along with training, agencies surveyed acknowledged 11 items that were needed to 
combat terrorism. These are: 
• Intelligence 
• Surveillance 
• Command, control and communications 
• Site hardening and security (protecting buildings, facilities, and 
outdoor events from terrorist attacks and reducing site vulnerability to 
attack and damage) 
• Detecting, disabling, and containing explosive devices 
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• Defending against cyber-terrorism -attacks using computers or 
computer networks (a special subset of site hardening and security) 
• Defending against weapons of mass destruction-specifically, nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (NBC) devices 
• Apprehending and disarming terrorists 
• Forensics and investigations 
• Public information 
• Crowd and riot control 
Source: National Institute of Justice, 1999. 
Funding is limited at state and local levels. Because of this, federal agencies must work 
with state and local agencies. Once such team effort is the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team of 
L.A. County supported by the FBI. The team coordinator, Gene McCarthy, explains that, "the 
MMST is a response asset specifically designed to address terrorist incidents involving weapons 
of mass destruction (Begert 1998: 39). Another such partnership is the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF). The JTTF of today has over 140 members from federal and local agencies 
working together. The two main objectives are "reactive" and "proactive." The purpose of the 
reactive objective is "to respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related criminal 
activity", and foreign terrorist groups and individual targeting or operating within the New York 
metropolitan area for the purpose of detecting, preventing and prosecuting their criminal activity 
(Martin 1999: 24). Other federal participation includes the passing of laws such as Public Law 
104-201 and The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (Seiple 1997). Also, the 
National League of Cities has published Domestic Terrorism: Resources for Local Government. 
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The publication is a resource that contains government agencies that can aid in responding to, or 
combating, terrorism (NLC publication 1999). 
Although all of these units, task forces, and legislation have been developed much more 
needs to be done. Chris Seiple of Parameters states that "it is clear that we are not prepared," but 
does say that we are "moving ahead" (Seiple 1997: 119). Juan Otero, author of "Commission 
Report Finds Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism 'Inadequate'" discusses just that. He 
says that preparedness is "woefully inadequate" and that more focus by the federal government 
should be placed upon first responders (Otero 1999: 6). The question, then, is just how 
unprepared are state and local agencies? What are they lacking? What exactly is 'inadequate'? 
RESEARCH METHDOLOGY 
Much of the following section is taken from the methodology as described in the 24-
month project sponsored by the National Institute of Justice entitled Domestic Terrorism: A 
National Assessment of State and Local Law Enforcement Preparedness. The project has three 
different resear~h areas. First a national survey was conducted, followed by the selection of ten 
agencies to be studied. Focusing on and identifying different programs used by agencies in 
regards to terrorism is the third area of interest. Because the study was completed by January 
1993, acts such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the pipe bombing at Centennial Olympic 
Park did not influence the responses. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Institute of Justice (NIl) 
helped in guiding the development of the survey. Before the survey was issued it was twice 
reviewed by the FBI and NIl. Its purpose was to; one, measure the threat of terrorism on both a 
state and local level; and two, discover the methods used by agencies to combat terrorism. 
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-Terrorism Defined 
The first question that needed answering was "what is terrorism?" Distinguishing 
terrorism from other criminal acts is not as simple as it may seem. The difference stated by 
Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman is that "the violence employed is not only in pursuit of 
some long-range political goal but is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions 
on a particular target audience" (Riley and Hoffman 1995: 3). Terrorist acts are all politically 
motivated, whereas other crimes may have various motives. Also, terrorists often boast of their 
"handy-work", unlike other criminals who deny and cover-up their actions. According to the 
FBI: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political 
or social objectives" (Riley and Hoffman 1995: 3). 
Because there are different definitions and perceptions of terrorism, it is sometimes 
difficult to obtain an accurate amount of terrorist incidents. When incidents are reported as being 
terrorist acts the FBI sometimes finds that these acts are "ordinary" crimes, but they are not 
pushed aside. The FBI uses these reports as an alert that terrorist acts could be developing. Also, 
the reports are used to get an idea of what state and local agencies view as terrorism. 
In regards to this study, the definition of terrorism is not restricted within the boundaries 
of the FBI definition. For the purpose of this research, agency perceptions of terrorism, as well 
as the official definition are used. Two other terms that have been focused on as having 
distinctly different definitions are anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. Anti-terrorism's focus is 
on preventions of terrorist acts, whereas counter-terrorism focuses on the response taken to such 
as act after or as it occurs. 
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Sample Units 
In order to study the preparedness of state and local agencies regarding terrorism, sample 
units needed to be established. For the sake of this research, three sample units were selected. 
Because the study calls for state agencies, two areas of state agencies were focused upon. One 
group is state law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcing the law and keeping order of 
the public. The second unit is also at the state level. These organizations are known as state 
emergency management organizations. Because these organizations deal with emergencies, as 
well as train and prepare for them, it was seen as logical to include them in this study. The third 
sample unit is local law enforcement agencies dealing within city, county, and/or township 
boundaries. In emergencies or incidents such as terrorist acts, these local agencies are most often 
first responders. They arrive first on the scene and do as much as their training and equipment 
will allow until state and federal officers arrive. Each sample unit plays an important role 
fighting and reacting to terrorism, explaining the importance of their preparation of, and training 
in, terrorism and its prevention. 
Selecting State Agencies 
The next step was selecting agencies for the study. The selection of state law 
enforcement agencies and state emergency management agencies was rather simple and basic. 
Each state has its law enforcement agency (state police) and its emergency management agency. 
This is a total of 50 state law enforcement agencies and 50 state emergency management 
agencies. Added to each sample unit are Puerto Rico's agencies, as well as agencies from the 
District of Columbia. This would give a total of 52 state law enforcement agencies and 52 state 
emergency management agencies . 
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-Selecting Local Agencies 
The selection of local agencies was somewhat more of a difficult task. Because not every 
local agency has been directly effected by terrorism, studying a random sample would not be 
reasonable. In order to obtain the information necessary for the study, a two-part sampling frame 
was used. Part one of the sampling frame organized jurisdictions by population, while part two 
organized them by the likelihood of a terrorist act occurring. By doing this, a targeted sample 
was established. Out of the 299 local agencies contacted, 139 were selected from the targeted 
pool and remaining 160 were from the population pool. 
Population Pool Sampling. In sampling from the population pool certain selection steps 
had to be taken. First, the United States was divided into the Midwest, Northeast, South, and 
West (resulting in 4 areas) using the census division. From each region 12 counties were 
selected resulting in 48 counties from the sampling pool. These 12 counties from each region 
were selected based on population. 
The first step was to utilize the 1990 census information in order to identify the three 
most populated counties from each region. No more than one county could come from a single 
state. This selection left only 36 more counties to identify. The second step was to identify three 
counties from each region with a population of more than 500,000. Next, counties were selected 
whose population ranged from 100,000 to 500,000. The last set of twelve was selected from 
counties with less than 100,000 people. Forty-eight counties were selected and "every county in 
the nation had a non-zero probability of landing in our sample" (Riley and Hoffman 1995: 7). 
After the counties had been selected, law enforcement agencies within these boundaries 
were chosen. The county or municipal agency of each county was asked to respond to the 
survey, as well as two other jurisdictions. Whenever permissible, these jurisdictions were chosen 
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randomly. Finally, a list was compiled and The National Directory of Law Enforcement 
Administrators and Correctional Agencies was used in order to obtain names of heads of 
departments. The heads of departments were then sent the survey and asked for their 
participation. 
Targeted Organization Selection. Information on targeted organizations was obtained 
from FBI reports and the RAND terrorism database. The National Directory of Law 
Enforcement Administration and Correctional Agencies was used once more to establish who 
was to be sent the survey. 
Survey Procedures 
Three mailings were sent and follow-up phone calls were made. The first mailing was 
sent to each agency and contained a description of RAND, a letter asking for participation, the 
actual survey, and a confidentiality statement. A second letter was ten days later thanking the 
agencies that had responded and reminding those who had not yet done so. If an agency still did 
not respond, a packet (same as the first) was sent once again. Follow-up calls were then made 
two weeks later to agencies that had not responded to the second packet. Agencies had 20 days 
after the follow-up call to respond, if not, they were replaced with another agency using the same 
sampling process. 
Response Rates 
The rate at which the agencies responded was similar between state law enforcement 
agencies and state emergency management agencies. Seventy-five percent of the 52 state law 
enforcement agencies took part in the survey (39 agencies). Those agencies not participating did 
so for different reasons. Three simply did not return the survey, five simply returned unfinished 
surveys and five responded by declining to participate. The state emergency management 
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-agencies had a 71 percent response rate (37 agencies out of 52). Only one of these agencies did 
not return the survey. Six came back incomplete and six declined to respond. 
Local law enforcement agencies had a smaller amount of respondents. Of the 160 
agencies selected from the population pool slightly over half (53%) of the agencies responded. 
The 139 targeted organizations were even lower in response rates. Forty-six percent, or 64 of 
these agencies, completed the survey. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are few research questions that are addressed in this study. They are as follows: 
RQ 1: What are some general characteristics of agency preparedness? 
RQ 2: What are the perceptions of organizations surveyed regarding the issues 
surrounding domestic terrorism threat assessment? 
RQ 3: What are the perceptions of organizations surveyed regarding the issues 
surrounding domestic terrorism risk assessment? 
RQ 4: What are the perceptions of organizations surveyed regarding the issues 
sun·ounding domestic terrorism threat environment? 
Research question 1 is addressed in the following analysis using tables with an "A" 
prefix. Research question 2 is addressed in the following analysis using tables with an "B" 
prefix. Research question 3 is addressed in the following analysis using tables with an "e" prefix. 
Research question 4 is addressed in the following analysis using tables with an "D" prefix. 
FINDINGS 
For the data in Table A.l respondents were asked the question: "Do you have contingency 
plans for dealing with the threat of terrorism?" By looking at the available data in Table A.l, just 
52% of the responding agencies have contingency plans. This is just over half, meaning that half 
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-of the agencies (state and local) are working towards preparedness. When looking at the 
response to D.9 the individual will note that 38.5% of agencies responded by saying that a 
terrorist incident in their jurisdiction within the next ten years is not very likely. This response 
may explain why so few agencies have contingency plans. 
T bl AlP a e resence 0 fC f on mgency PI an 
Valid Cumulative 
Fre_quency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 77 52.0 52.0 52.0 
No 71 48.0 48.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
T bl A 2 In~ a e ormatIon E h . hS xc ange WIt tate A ,gencles 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
.- Valid 2or3 
times/mo 3 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Once/mnth 
or two 15 10.1 10.1 12.2 
A few 
times/year 45 30.4 30.4 42.6 
Annually 18 12.2 12.2 54.7 
Never 62 41.9 41.9 96.6 
As needed 3 2.0 2.0 98.6 
Missing_ 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table A.2 respondents were asked the question: "How often does your 
department meet or exchange information on terrorism with state agencies?" According to Table 
A.2, local agencies surveyed do not seem to communicate with state agencies, if at all, 
concerning contingency plans or terrorism related incidents. Forty-one point nine percent of the 
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agencies (62) "never" exchange information with state agencies, while 30.4% do so just "a few 
-
times/year." Annually 12.2% of the agencies (18) exchange the information with the state. When 
adding the agencies together that exchange information annually and those that do so a few times 
each year the total is 42.6% participation. 
T bl A 3 Inf a e ormatIOn E h ·thF d IA xc ange WI e era ,gencies 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 2or3 
times/mo 2 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Every 
mnth or 
two 15 10.1 10.1 11.5 
A few 
times/year 40 27.0 27.0 38.5 
Annually 23 15.5 15.5 54.1 
Never 59 39.9 39.9 93.9 
As needed 5 3.4 3.4 97.3 
MissinR 4 2.7 2.7 100.0 
-
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table A.3 respondents were asked the question: "How often does your 
department meet or exchange information on terrorism with federal agencies?" The results of this 
variable, as shown in Table A.3, are not much different than the "exchange of information with 
state agencies." Twenty-two percent of the agencies communicate "a few times/year" with 
federal agencies, while 59 (39.9%) agencies never communicate with federal agencies. This 
leaves only 11.5% of local agencies communicating frequently (2/3 times per month or every 
month or two) with federal agencies. 
For the data in Table A.4 respondents were asked the question: "Does your state have 
defined guidelines for the investigation of terrorism?" Table A.4 shows that of the 148 agencies 
-
surveyed, only 30 (20.3%) say that their state has defined the guidelines for the investigation of 
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terrorism. This is not a surprise considering that little importance has been placed on domestic 
terrorism. Ninety-six agencies (64.9%) report that their state does not have defined guidelines. 
T bl A4 D f dS a e e me tate G ·d r Ul e mes or vestIgatlOn 0 fT erronsm 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 30 20.3 20.3 20.3 
No 96 64.9 64.9 85.1 
Missing 5 3.4 3.4 88.5 
Don't 
Know 17 11.5 11.5 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
T bl A5 D f dD a e e me epartment G ·d r t: In Ul e mes or vesttga IOn 0 fT erronsm 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 31 20.9 20.9 20.9 
No 109 73.6 73.6 94.6 
Missing 7 4.7 4.7 99.3 
Don't 
know 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table A.5 respondents were asked the question: "Does your department 
have defined guidelines for the investigation of terrorism?" According to Table A.5, An even 
greater number of departments do not have guidelines (73.6%). This comes as no surprise 
considering their states more than likely do not have specific guidelines. Only 20.9% of 
departments replied with a yes to this question. This is extremely low considering local 
departments are more than likely to be first responders to terrorism. 
For the data in Table A.6 respondents were asked the question: "Is counter- or anti-
terrorism covered in your Police Academy?" The answers found in Table A.6 are rather 
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disturbing. The academy is where learning and training should occur. Only 20.3% of agencies 
replied with a yes, while 78.4% of agencies stated that no such training was offered . 
T bl A 6 C a e ounter or A ·T . P r A d ntI- erronsm m o Ice ca emy 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 30 20.3 20.3 20.3 
No 116 78.4 78.4 98.6 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table A7 respondents were asked the question: "Does your state provide 
special training in counter- or anti-terrorism, other than the Academy?" According to Table A7 
the data shows that 64.2% of agencies do not receive special training from the state. This is 
rather high considering local agencies are usually the first responders. Five agencies (3.4%) are 
not aware of any training. This should be an area of interest for both local agencies (first 
responders) and the state. 
T bl A 7 S a e tate P ·d d S . IT· . roVI e ~ecla rammg 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 42 28.4 28.4 28.4 
No 95 64.2 64.2 92.6 
Missing 6 4.1 4.1 96.6 
Don't 
know 5 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table A8 respondents were asked the question: "How many people in 
your department have received special training in counter- or anti-terrorism?" By looking at 
-
Table A8 the greatest number of agencies are found to not possess any officers with special 
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-,-
.-
training in anti- or counter-terrorism. Twenty-three point six percent of agencies report that not a 
single officer received special training in counter or anti-terrorism. Thirteen agencies (8.8%) 
reported that two officers received special training. There was one agency that reported having 
500 officers trained, but that is only one agency. Answers range from 0-500, but there were 35 
agencies without a single officer receiving special training. 
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T bl A 8 N b Th t R . d S . IT' . a e .. urn er a ecelve _pecla rammg 
Valid Cumulative ,- Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 0 35 23.6 23.6 23.6 
1 8 5.4 5.4 29.1 
2 13 8.8 8.8 37.8 
3 7 4.7 4.7 42.6 
4 4 2.7 2.7 45.3 
5 7 4.7 4.7 50.0 
6 2 1.4 1.4 51.4 
7 1 .7 .7 52.0 
8 3 2.0 2.0 54.1 
9 1 .7 .7 54.7 
10 6 4.1 4.1 58.8 
12 3 2.0 2.0 60.8 
13 1 .7 .7 61.5 
14 2 1.4 1.4 62.8 
15 9 6.1 6.1 68.9 
18 1 .7 .7 69.6 
20 8 5.4 5.4 75.0 
21 1 .7 .7 75.7 
22 1 .7 .7 76.4 
-
23 1 .7 .7 77.0 
25 2 1.4 1.4 78.4 
26 1 .7 .7 79.1 
29 1 .7 .7 79.7 
30 3 2.0 2.0 81.8 
31 1 .7 .7 82.4 
34 1 .7 .7 83.1 
35 1 .7 .7 83.8 
40 3 2.0 2.0 85.8 
50 2 1.4 1.4 87.2 
70 1 .7 .7 87.8 
72 1 .7 .7 88.5 
88 1 .7 .7 89.2 
100 1 .7 .7 89.9 
102 1 .7 .7 90.5 
500 1 .7 .7 91.2 
Missing 4 2.7 2.7 93.9 
Don't 
know 9 6.1 6.1 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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For the data in Table A.9 respondents were asked the question: "Does your department 
have a special unit, section, group or person that is specifically concerned with terrorism?" Table 
A.9 shows that over half of the agencies surveyed does not have a special terrorism unit. This 
coincides with the 64.2% not receiving special training in the area of terrorism or its threat. 
T bl A 9 D a e . h S . IT e2artment WIt ;pecla erronsm U' mtor S ectlOn 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 50 33.8 33.8 33.8 
No 92 62.2 62.2 95.9 
Missing 6 4.1 4.1 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table B.1 respondents were asked the question: "Have you identified any 
terrorist groups in your jurisdiction?" According to Table B.1, the number of agencies able to 
-
identify terrorist groups in their jurisdiction is rather low. Only 32.4% have identified terrorist 
groups in their area and 30.4% have not identified terrorist groups. This number is not surprising 
considering over half of the agencies do not receive special training concerning terrorism. This 
leads one to believe that without training the ability to identify terrorist groups may be lessened. 
T bl B 1 Id 'f d T a e ent! Ie . G erronst . J'd' . roups III uns IctlOn 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 48 32.4 32.4 32.4 
No 45 30.4 30.4 62.8 
No; yes 
below 50 33.8 33.8 96.6 
Yes; no 
info below 2 1.4 1.4 98.0 
Missing 3 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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Table B.2a shows that right-wing terrorist groups are believed to exist in 61.5% of the 
jurisdictions. No agencies responded negatively to question, but the remaining 38.5% of the 
agencies did not respond. Tables B2a and B2b are results from the following survey question: 
"Do you have any of the following terrorist groups located in your state (This includes not only 
those who have committed acts of politically motivated violence, but also those who may have, 
or may be planning acts of politically motivated violence)?" Respondents were asked to circle 
all responses that apply. 
T bl B 2 R h W' T . G . J'd' f a e . a: 19l t mg erronst roups m uns IC Ion 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 91 61.5 61.5 61.5 
Missing 57 38.5 38.5 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
- Table B.2b shows that over half (56.8%) of agencies do report issue specific terrorist 
groups. Issue specific groups are also known as radicals. Examples of such groups would be, 
anti-abortionists, environmentalists, and animal rights organizations. 
T bl B 2b I a e ssue S T T specI IC erronsts G . J'd' . roups m uns Ictton 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 84 56.8 56.8 56.8 
Missing 64 43.2 43.2 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Tables B.3a and B.3b respondents were asked the question: "In the last ten 
years, roughly how many incidents have been attributed to terrorist groups in your jurisdiction? 
-
Please give us your best estimate." According to Table B.3a, roughly 33% of agencies surveyed 
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have encountered right-wing terrorist action. Of this, 18.2% have reported 1-5 right-wing 
.- incidents. Thirty··three point one percent of agencies have not encountered such action and 
another 32.4% of the agency responses are missing. 
T bl B 3 N b f R ht W' In' d t a e . a: urn ero IgJ mg CI en s 
Valid Cumulative 
Fr~quency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 0 49 33.1 33.1 33.1 
1-5 27 18.2 18.2 51.4 
6-10 12 8.1 8.1 59.5 
11-15 5 3.4 3.4 62.8 
16-20 2 1.4 1.4 64.2 
Over 21 3 2.0 2.0 66.2 
Missing 48 32.4 32.4 98.6 
Don't 
know 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
T bl B 3b N b fI a e urn ero S 'f In 'd ssue >gecI IC CI ents 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid 0 42 28.4 28.4 28.4 
1-5 32 21.6 21.6 50.0 
6-10 7 4.7 4.7 54.7 
11-15 7 4.7 4.7 59.5 
16-20 3 2.0 2.0 61.5 
Over 21 7 4.7 4.7 66.2 
Missing 49 33.1 33.1 99.3 
Don't 
know 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Table B.3b addresses "issue specific" incidents (e.g., ideologically driven incidents). 
Once more 33% of the agency answers are missing in Table B3.b. Only one agency was not sure 
-
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and 2804% reported no specific-issue incidents. The remaining 37.7% reported at least one 
- incident. 
For the data in Table B.4 respondents were asked the question: "How has your 
department been involved in any terrorist or terrorist-related incident in the last five years?" 
Concerning departments not involved in terrorist incidents, Table Bo4 shows that almost half 
(49.3%) of the agency responses are missing. However, just over half of agencies report not 
having been involved in a terrorist incident. 
T bl B 4 D a e epartment N In I d· T ot vo ve III . In·d erronst Cl ent 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 75 50.7 50.7 50.7 
Missing 73 49.3 49.3 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table B.5 respondents were asked the question: "What type of support 
have you received from Federal agencies for terrorist investigations?" According to Table B.5, 
only 2 (1.4%) agencies do not know whether they receive or have received federal support 
(intelligence). There are 81 agencies (54.7%) that did answer "yes" to the question leading one 
to believe that at least minimal corroboration exists between local and federal agencies. 
T bl B 5 F d ] S a e e era upport: In II· te Igence 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 81 54.7 54.7 54.7 
Missing 65 43.9 43.9 98.6 
Don't 
Know 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
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For the data in Table B.6 respondents were asked the question: "Which agencies do you 
coordinate with during terrorist investigations?" The results of Table B.6 do give hope in that 
local agencies have somewhat of a working relationship with the federal agencies. Only 35.1 % 
of the answers are missing, but this still does not allow one to make any definitive conclusions. 
Over half of the agencies have completed investigations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). 
T bl B 6 In a e . hFBI vestIgatlOns WIt 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 96 64.9 64.9 64.9 
Missing 52 35.1 35.1 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table B.7 respondents were asked the question: "How would you 
categorize your general working relationship with these Federal agencies at this time?" 
According to Table B.7, only 13.5% of local agency responses are missing and only 2 agencies 
reported having a poor relationship with federal agencies. This results in an overall at least a 
decent if not "very good" working relationship between local and federal agencies. 
T bl B 7 W k' R l' h' 'hFd lA a e or mg e attons IpS wIt e era 1gencles 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very good 60 40.5 40.5 40.5 
Good 40 27.0 27.0 67.6 
Average 20 13.5 13.5 81.1 
Fair 6 4.1 4.1 85.1 
Poor 2 1.4 1.4 86.5 
Missing; 20 13.5 13.5 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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For the data in Table C.I respondents were asked the question: "Has your department 
- conducted a threat assessment of the vulnerabilities of key pUblic, private, governmental and 
military facilities, and infrastructure for a range of contingencies including terrorism?" 
Disregarding the "missing" responses in Table C.l, the agencies surveyed were split 45.3% to 
45.3% on whether or not a threat assessment was conducted for a range of contingencies. 
T bl C I Th a e reat A D R ssessment or angeo fC ontmgencles 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 67 45.3 45.3 45.3 
No 67 45.3 45.3 90.5 
Missing 14 9.5 9.5 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table C.2 respondents were asked the question: "Did a state agency or 
department complete a threat assessment?" According to Table C.2, over half (57.4%) of state 
agencies have not completed a threat assessment. 
T bl C 2 T a e erronsm Th reat A ssessment C ompJete db S >y tate or D epartment 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 17 11.5 11.5 11.5 
No 85 57.4 57.4 68.9 
Missing 37 25.0 25.0 93.9 
Don't 
know 9 6.1 6.1 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table C.3 respondents were asked the question: "Has your department 
done a threat assessment specifically for terrorism?" Table C.3 shows that over half of the 
.- agencies (62.2%) have not conducted a threat assessment on terrorism. Only 18% have, which 
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once again supports the motion that such agencies are not prepared for terrorism. Terrorism does 
-
not seem to be an area that much focus is placed upon or in which training is provided. 
T bl C 3 Th a e reat A ssessment: T S 'f errOflsm >peCI IC 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 27 18.2 18.2 18.2 
No 92 62.2 62.2 80.4 
Missing; 29 19.6 19.6 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table C.4 respondents were asked the question: "Are there any other 
facilities in your jurisdiction that would make your state a more attractive target to terrorist 
attack, as opposed to a neighboring jurisdiction?" Responses to this survey question, found in 
Table C. 4, leave an individual without any information. Sixty-four agencies (43.2%) believe 
-
that there is a facility in their jurisdiction that would make their state an "attractive target" of 
terrorism. Another 68 agencies (45.9%) do not believe that they possess any facility other than 
those already surveyed that are attractive terrorist targets. What other facilities do agencies 
believe are attractive? One will never know by analyzing this particular data. 
Table C.4: In Jurisdiction: Other Facilities 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 64 43.2 43.2 43.2 
No 68 45.9 45.9 89.2 
Missing 15 10.1 10.1 99.3 
Don't 
Know 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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For the data in Table D.I respondents were asked the question: "In your opinion, is the 
-
threat of terrorism now greater, less, or about the same in the United States than it was five years 
ago?" According to Table D.1, almost half (45.9%) of agencies believe the threat of terrorism is 
about the same as five years ago, making one believe that this could be one reason agencies lack 
training and have not made too much effort to do a threat assessment or to develop a contingency 
plan. There are 36 agencies that believe terrorism is more of a threat now. It would be 
interesting to see if these same agencies have received special training or have developed a 
contingency plan. Without knowing how agencies answered the questions on the survey this may 
never be known. 
T bl D 1 Th t fT a e rea 0 erronsm N V ow ersus 5Y ears A eKo 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Greater 36 24.3 24.3 24.3 
--
Less 41 27.7 27.7 52.0 
About 
the same 68 45.9 45.9 98.0 
Missing 3 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table D.2 respondents were asked the question: "What impact, if any, did 
the threat of terrorism during the Gulf War last year have on your agency?" It is interesting to 
find in Table D.2 that a little over half of the agencies surveyed report that the Gulf War had 
"little impact" on terrorism and 31.8% there was "no impact" on terrorism. This is interesting 
because of the typical (if not stereotypical) association of terrorism with the Middle East. 
-
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T bl D 2 1m a e lpact 0 fG IfW u aron T erronsm 
Valid Cumulative 
- Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Great 
deal 23 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Little 
imI>act 76 51.4 51.4 66.9 
No impact 47 31.8 31.8 98.6 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table D.3 respondents were asked the question: "Were you satisfied with 
the sources and quality of information on the possible terrorist threat in the U.S. during the Gulf 
War?" Agencies did not believe that the Gulf War had an impact on terrorism. This in tum 
causes the findings of this variable to seem rather reasonable. Only 16% did not believe that they 
received adequate information on terrorism during the Gulf War. Seventy-nine percent reported 
-
that they did recei ve adequate information. They possibly are those who do not believe that there 
was much of an impact on terrorism. 
T bl D 3 S . f a e atIs actIOn 0 fT . Inf erronst ormatIOn d . th G lfW unng e u ar 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 117 79.1 79.1 79.1 
No 24 16.2 16.2 95.3 
Missing 7 4.7 4.7 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Tables D.4a through D.4k respondents were asked the question: "How 
useful have you found sources of information on terrorism?" One quarter (25%) of the agencies 
found in Table D.4a has never used these materials in researching terrorism. 
-
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T bl D 4 H U fIB k . . d' I f t bI' t' a e . a: ow se u : 00 s, Jouma s, peno lca s, non- aw en orcemen J>u lca Ions. 
Valid Cumulative 
- Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 37 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Not useful 10 6.8 6.8 31.8 
Somewhat 
useful 65 43.9 43.9 75.7 
Very useful 7 4.7 4.7 80.4 
Missing 29 19.6 19.6 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table D.4b, a quarter of the agencies have not ever used the reports that are 
available to them and of those that have 57.4% find the reports to be at least somewhat useful. 
Only 6% find them not useful. 
T bl D 4b H U f I FBI 'f d a e ow se u: unc asSI Ie reports. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 38 25.7 25.7 25.7 
Not useful 9 6.1 6.1 31.8 
Somewhat 
useful 69 46.6 46.6 78.4 
Very useful 16 10.8 10.8 89.2 
Missing 16 10.8 10.8 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Almost 50% (49.3%) of agencies in Table D.4c have never used classified reports. Two 
percent found them to be not useful and 21.6% found them to be somewhat useful. Only 10.1 % 
found unclassified reports to be very useful. 
-
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Table D.4c: How Use u : c assl Ie f 1 FBI lTd reports. 
Valid Cumulative 
.- Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 73 49.3 49.3 49.3 
Not useful 3 2.0 2.0 51.4 
Somewhat 
useful 32 21.6 21.6 73.0 
Very useful 15 10.1 10.1 83.1 
Missing 25 16.9 16.9 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table D.4d, 28% of agencies have either never used other federal agencies 
for information, or find them to not be useful. On the other hand, 55.4% of the agencies find that 
using other agencies is either somewhat or very useful. 
T bl D 4d H U f 10th t d a e ow se u : er e era agencIes. 
Valid Cumulative 
- Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 36 24.3 24.3 24.3 
Not useful 6 4.1 4.1 28.4 
Somewhat 
Useful 68 45.9 45.9 74.3 
Very useful 14 9.5 9.5 83.8 
Missing 24 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
By looking at the results of Table D .4e, almost 50% (49.3 %) of agencies find that street 
sources are somewhat or very useful. Only 9.5% responded with a not useful, meaning that 
outside informants are more likely to aid in areas such as terrorism than not. 
-
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Table D 4e' How Useful' Informants sources on the street , 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 32 21.6 21.6 21.6 
Not useful 14 9.5 9.5 31.1 
Somewhat 
Useful 50 33.8 33.8 64.9 
Very useful 23 15.5 15.5 80.4 
Missing 29 19.6 19.6 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table D.4f, the number of agencies that have never used other local 
jurisdictions as a source for information is rather high. Because terrorist acts happen locally one 
would expect neighboring jurisdictions to work together. A little over half (55.4%) of agencies 
find working with other jurisdictions even somewhat useful. In order to become a stronger force 
against terrorism, better working relationships need to be formed . 
. -
T bl D 4f H U flO h I I' . d' . a e ow se u: t er oca uns lctlons. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 28 18.9 18.9 18.9 
Not useful 13 8.8 8.8 27.7 
Somewhat 
Useful 56 37.8 37.8 65.5 
Very useful 26 17.6 17.6 83.1 
Missing 25 16.9 16.9 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table D.4g, only 26 of 148 agencies do not find the media to be useful. 
This is a shock because the media has been viewed almost somewhat of an enemy at times by 
-
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running top secret stories and not always being exactly truthful at all times. These are very 
interesting results due to the media's one-sided or not so realistic perspectives on certain topics. 
T bl D 4 H U f 1 Th d· a e . fg: ow se u : e me la. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 12 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Not useful 26 17.6 17.6 25.7 
Somewhat 
useful 76 51.4 51.4 77.0 
Very useful 11 704 704 84.5 
Missing 23 15.5 15.5 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Even though only 19 agencies are shown in Table DAh as never using professional law 
enforcement pUblications, this number seems to be rather high. Of those agencies that have used 
these publications 68.9% find them to be at least somewhat useful and only 304% find them to be 
- not useful. 
T bl D 4h H U f 1 P ~ a e ow se u : ro eSSlOna 11 aw en orcement pu bI" lcatIons. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 19 12.8 12.8 12.8 
Not useful 5 304 304 16.2 
Somewhat 
useful 90 60.8 60.8 77.0 
Very useful 12 8.1 8.1 85.1 
Missing 22 14.9 14.9 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table DAi, fifty-two agencies or 35.1 % have never used alternative 
publications and 62 agencies find it to be at least somewhat useful. Another 7 agencies find such 
sources to not be useful and 18 responses are missing. 
-
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T bl D 4' H U fIR d' I bI' f a e . 1: ow se u : a lca QU lca lon, 0 th "alt er f "I't t ema lve 1 era ure. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 52 35.1 35.1 35.1 
Not useful 7 4.7 4.7 39.9 
Somewhat 
Useful 53 35.8 35.8 75.7 
Very useful 9 6.1 6.1 81.8 
Missing 27 18.2 18.2 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Table D.4j shows that 50% of agencies have never even used this type of source. Of 
those who have used it, only 7.4% find it to be not useful out of 30%. 
T bl D 4' H U fIR' k a e . fJ: ow se u : IS assessmen t serVIces or £u bI' f lca Ions 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 75 50.7 50.7 50.7 
Not useful 11 7.4 7.4 58.1 
Somewhat 
useful 28 18.9 18.9 77.0 
Very useful 6 4.1 4.1 81.1 
Missing 28 18.9 18.9 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
According to Table D.4k, of the 98 agencies that have used state agencies as a source 
only 9 have found state agencies to be not useful. 
-
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bl D 4k H U f I S Ta e ow se u : tate agencIes. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Never used 25 16.9 16.9 16.9 
Not useful 9 6.1 6.1 23.0 
Somewhat 
useful 64 43.2 43.2 66.2 
Very useful 25 16.9 16.9 83.1 
Missing 25 16.9 16.9 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Tables D.5a through D.5j respondents were asked the question: "How 
likely do you think that terrorists will attack in the next 10 years on the following facilities?" It 
is evident by Table D.5a that the terrorist threat concerning commercial airlines is still a concern. 
Sixty-nine point six percent of agencies feel that it is at least somewhat likely to happen within 
the next ten years. The 27 agencies that perceive that it is "not very likely" and the ten that think 
it is "not likely" must be confident with airline security. 
Table D 5a' Possible Attack' Domestic Commercial Airlines 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 43 29.1 29.1 29.1 
Somewhat 
likely 60 40.5 40.5 69.6 
Not very 
likely 27 18.2 18.2 87.8 
Not likely 10 6.8 6.8 94.6 
Missing 7 4.7 4.7 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
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Table D.5b: Possible Attac : an Ill! esta IS ments. k B k· bI" h 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 19 12.8 12.8 12.8 
Somewhat 
likely 46 31.1 31.1 43.9 
Not very 
likely 44 29.7 29.7 73.6 
Not likelv 27 18.2 18.2 91.9 
Missing 11 7.4 7.4 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Excluding the 11 agencies in Table D.5b that did not answer this question, the agencies 
almost split in half of whether or not they believe possible attack on a bank is likely to happen. 
Robberies are most likely what we associate with banks, not terrorist acts. 
-
It seems that from looking at the data in Table D.5c, only 9.5% of agencies see DOE 
nuclear installations as a concern, when 15.5% do not view this particular site as a concern 
whatsoever. 
Table D.5c: Possible Attack: DOE nuclear installations. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 14 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Somewhat 
likely 54 36.5 36.5 45.9 
Not very 
likely 44 29.7 29.7 75.7 
Not likely 23 15.5 15.5 91.2 
Missing 12 8.1 8.1 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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------ ~--~--~~ 
T bl D 5d P 'bl A k P bl' f a e OSSl e ttac : u IC Igures. 
- Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely_ 49 33.1 33.1 33.1 
Somewhat 
likely 58 39.2 39.2 72.3 
Not very 
likely 24 16.2 16.2 88.5 
Not likely 9 6.1 6.1 94.6 
Missing 7 4.7 4.7 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Table D.5d shows that a possible attack on public figures seems to be a concern for 
agencies. When the percentages are added together for the "very likely" and "somewhat likely" 
responses one can see that a total of 72.3% of agencies are found here. Seventy-two point three 
percent of agencies believe that it is at least somewhat likely, while 22.3% do not perceive this as 
too much of a concern. 
T bl D 5 P 'bl A k MT a e . e: OSSI e ttac : Iltary In 11 . sta attons. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 10 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Somewhat 
likely 45 30.4 30.4 37.2 
Not very 
likely 52 35.1 35.1 72.3 
Not likely 32 21.6 21.6 93.9 
Missing 8 5.4 5.4 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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According to Table D.5e, agencies (32) do not find it likely that military installations are 
at high risk of attack. Another 52 agencies did not find it very likely that they are possible targets 
of attack. 
It is interesting to find in Table D.5f that agencies believe commercial nuclear plants are 
more likely to be the targets of attack than are military installations. Fifty-four percent perceive 
that commercial nuclear plants are at least somewhat likely of being the targets of a terrorist 
attack, while 37.2 % believe military installations are at least somewhat likely of being a target. 
T bl D 5f P ·bl A k C . I a e OSSI e ttac : ommerCIa nuc ear p. ants. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 18 12.2 12.2 12.2 
Somewhat 
likely 62 41.9 41.9 54.1 
Not very 
likely 40 27.0 27.0 81.1 
Not likely 21 14.2 14.2 95.3 
Missing 6 4.1 4.1 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
Because this data was collected prior to incidents such as the Oklahoma City Bombing 
and the pipe bombing at the 1996 Summer Olympic games the answers in Table D.5g were not 
influenced by these incidents. Only 15.5% of agencies believe that a terrorist attack on a large 
public gathering place is "very likely" and 36.5% believe that such an attack is "not very likely" 
and "not likely" at all. These responses seem to be somewhat different than if agencies had been 
surveyed directly after the two events mentioned previously. 
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Table D.5g: Possible Attack: Large public gathering places (stadiums, malls, theater complexes, 
Arenas) 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 23 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Somewhat 
likely 59 39.9 39.9 55.4 
Not very 
likely 39 26.4 26.4 81.8 
Not likely 15 10.1 10.1 91.9 
Missing 11 7.4 7.4 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
The results of Table D.5h show that the greatest number of agencies fall into the 
"somewhat" likely category at 41.9%. This section of the question seems to have numbers 
spread across the board. "Not very likely" contains the next largest sum of agencies with 32 
(21.6%). Eleven agencies did not answer and one does not know. Because of this we are left 
with 137 agencies to analyze. Twenty-seven agencies or 18.2 % that perceive that this attack is 
very likely, but there are also 10.1 % that do not believe that it is likely. 
T bl D 5h P ·bl A k T I a e OSSI e ttac : e ecommumcatlons systems. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 27 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Somewhat 
likely 62 41.9 41.9 60.1 
Not very 
likely 32 21.6 21.6 81.8 
Not likely 15 10.1 10.1 91.9 
Missing 11 7.4 7.4 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
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5 'bl A k T Table D. i: POSSI e ttac : ransportatlon systems. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 23 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Somewhat 
Likely_ 61 41.2 41.2 56.8 
Not very 
Likely 36 24.3 24.3 81.1 
Not likely 16 10.8 10.8 91.9 
Missing 11 7.4 7.4 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
The results of Table D.5i are rather interesting. Although a total of 56.8% of the agencies 
responded "very likely" and "somewhat likely" one would expect a greater number. 
T bl D 5' P 'bl A k UtTf t a e .IJ: OSSI e ttac : 11 les, energy, wa er. 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 31 20.9 20.9 20.9 
Somewhat 
likely 51 34.5 34.5 55.4 
Not very 
likely_ 37 25.0 25.0 80.4 
Not likely 18 12.2 12.2 92.6 
Missin~ 10 6.8 6.8 99.3 
Don't 1 .7 .7 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
A little over half (55.4%) of the agencies in Table D.5j report that a possible attack on 
utilities; energy or water is at least "somewhat likely." Another quarter of the agencies (37) 
believe that this type of attack is "not very likely." Ten of the agencies failed to answer the 
-
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question and one did not know; so by looking at what is provided it seems that this type of attack 
--
is somewhat of a concern. 
For the data in Table D.6 respondents were asked the question: "During the next ten 
years, how likely do you think a major terrorist attack will occur in the United States? By major 
terrorist attack we mean one on a nuclear installation, or using chemical or biological weapons, 
or producing large numbers of casualties." Because this is a study from 1992 we have the 
advantage of deciding how well the agencies predicted terrorist attacks. Table D.6 shows those 
52 agencies in the "not very likely" category and the 22 in the "not likely" category were wrong. 
The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City was the worst terrorist we have ever 
experienced in this country. Over 160 men, women and children were killed. A mere 6% 
believed it was very likely. As history pointed out, these 6% were correct. 
Table D.6: Likelihood of A Terrorist Attack in the United States in the Next 10 Years 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 9 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Somewhat 
likely 61 41.2 41.2 47.3 
Not very 
likely 52 35.1 35.1 82.4 
Not likely 22 14.9 14.9 97.3 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 98.6 
Don't know 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table D.7 respondents were asked the question: "Has a likelihood of a 
major terrorist attack increased, decreased, or stayed the same during the last five years?" Table 
D.7 raises an interesting question. Thirty percent believes the likelihood has increased yet the 
number of agencies, or officers receiving specialized training are extremely low. 
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Table 0.7: Likelihood of A Terrorist Attack in the Last 5 Years: Increased, Decreased, 
o S h S r tay t e arne 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Increased 45 30.4 30.4 30.4 
Decreased 40 27.0 27.0 57.4 
Stayed the 
same 61 41.2 41.2 98.6 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table 0.8 respondents were asked the question: "How well prepared are 
you to respond to such an incident?" According to Table 0.8, over half of the agencies (55.4%) 
fell into the "somewhat prepared" category. Thirty percent reported that they were not well 
prepared. Eighty plus percent of our agencies are not comfortable with the fight against 
terrorism. 
-
T bl 08 H P a e ow rep are dF T or . In'd . d' . errOrIst Cl ent m JUrIS lctlon 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Vry well 
preprd 2 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Well 
prepared 16 10.8 10.8 12.2 
Smewht 
prepared 82 55.4 55.4 67.6 
Not well 
preprd 45 30.4 30.4 98.0 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 99.3 
Don't 
know 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
-
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·- Tabl D 9· Likelihood of Incident in Your Jurisdiction in Next 10 Years e ..
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Very likely 2 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Somewhat 
likely 38 25.7 25.7 27.0 
Not very 
likely 57 38.5 38.5 65.5 
Not likelv 47 31.8 31.8 97.3 
Missing 2 1.4 1.4 98.6 
Don't 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
know 
Total 148 100.0 100.0 
Total 148 100.0 
For the data in Table D.9 respondents were asked the question: "How likely do you think 
such an incident in your jurisdiction is in the next ten years?" Table D.9 shows that only 31.8% 
of agencies believed that they are exempt from terrorist attack, but only 1.4% reports being at 
--
extreme risk. This leaves about 64% of agencies somewhere in the middle. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Four research questions were addressed in the study. Research question #1 asked for 
general characteristics of agency preparedness. Survey questions sought information on issues 
such as contingency plans, information exchanged between agencies, state and departmental 
terrorism investigation guidelines, police academy training, special training involving anti- and 
counter terrorism, and special terrorism units within agencies. The results have shown that, as 
whole, agencies are lacking sufficient training and few posses practical preparedness strategies. 
Research question #2 focuses on agency threat assessment perceptions. Agencies were 
asked questions pertaining to terrorist groups in their jurisdiction, the number of terrorist 
incidents in their jurisdiction, and work done by agencies with the federal government and its 
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agencIes. Over half of the agencies surveyed indicated having terrorist groups in their 
jurisdiction. If so, they were referring to right wing and issue specific groups. Over half have 
also completed investigations with the FBI. Also, 85.7% of agencies were found to have had at 
least a "fair" working relationship with federal agencies. 
The third research question addressed risk assessment. Agencies were asked if a threat 
assessment had been done for a range of contingencies, including terrorism. Also, researchers 
wanted to know, specifically, if the state or department had completed such a task associated 
with terrorism. Agencies were asked if they had an attractive target in their state making it more 
alluring for terrorists. All of these survey questions allowed for the analysis of risk assessment. 
As a result of such questions, it was discovered that over half (57.4%) of state agencies and over 
half (62.2%) of departmental agencies have not completed a threat assessment. This leads to the 
conclusion that not much focus has been placed upon domestic terrorism. 
The final research question addressed topics such as the threat of terrorism now versus 
five years ago, the usefulness of different information sources on terrorists, and the likelihood of 
a terrorist attack on certain types of facilities. It was found that 45.9% of agencies believed that 
the threat of a domestic terrorist attack is about the same as five years ago. Also, by reviewing 
the sources used by agencies on domestic terrorism it is interesting to find that so few agencies 
use other agencies as a source and that so few sources are used by agencies in order to obtain 
information on domestic terrorism. Only 12.2% of agencies were confident in their fight against 
terrorism. This is an extremely low proportion, reinforcing the conclusion that agencies are 
inadequately prepared for such an attack. 
The results show that agencies were not prepared for domestic terrorism in 1992 when the 
survey was administered. Again, it would be beneficial for researchers to find if there have been 
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-changes in both threat assessment and preparedness. Focus should be on the bombings in the 
past five years, as well as on the likelihood of a domestic terrorist attack on military installations. 
In 1992, over half of the agencies (56.7%) reported that military installations were not at great 
risk for attack. With the presence of militia groups these numbers may have changed. Because 
of such an increase in militia membership this should be a focus of further research. 
The results of the study on state and local preparedness show that agencies and 
departments are not ready for domestic terrorist attacks. They receive very little, if any, training, 
over half of agencies do not have a contingency plan, and local departments are lacking in 
domestic terrorism guidelines. Departments and agencies are first responders, meaning that 
training and knowledge is extremely important. Another area of concern is the working 
relationships between different levels of agencies. Responses show, for the most part, that 
relationships are good, but most only exchange information a few times a year, if at all. The 
results clearly show that departments and agencies are not only ill prepared for domestic 
terrorism, but need to work cooperatively to address this mutual concern and threat. 
CONCLUSION 
This study of state and local preparedness has allowed for the evaluation of agency 
perceptions regarding terrorism. The evaluation of existing data included training received, 
threat assessment, contingency plans and the existence of terrorist groups in the agency's 
jurisdiction. These 1992 findings show that agencies, overall, do not seem to be very concerned 
with terrorist attack or preparation. Only half of the agencies have contingency plans and a 
mere 20.9% of departments surveyed have defined guidelines for dealing with domestic 
terrorism. Training is not offered 80% of the time in the academy and 95 agencies report not 
having state instruction. The results showing very low training and contingency plan existence 
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could possibly explain why 52 agencies believed that a terrorist attack in the next 10 years was 
not very likely. Lack of preparedness is a result of little, if any, training. 
Due to the fact that this study was conducted before incidents such as the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing and the 1996 pipe bomb explosion at Centennial Olympic Park, some responses 
could possibly be different today. The threat of terrorism and preparedness both could be 
higher in number as a result. One only hopes that agencies are taking training and threat of 
terrorism more seriously. 
Findings in this research are very beneficial. By using agencies of all different sizes and 
locations it allows for more comprehensive perceptions of how agencies handle the threat of 
terrorism. Information uncovered can allow for changes to be made in every department or 
agency. This is especially true to local agencies since these agencies will likely be first 
responders to domestic terrorist attacks. 
The strengths of this study are found in the results. First, the researchers knew what they 
wanted to study. State agencies were important to the study, as were local agencies and 
departments that are most often the first responders to acts of terrorism. Because of this reality, 
both state and local agencies were selected. Another strength of the study is it thoroughness. 
Many different areas were addressed, giving a better overall picture of terrorism perceptions 
and agency preparedness. Threat assessment, as well as officer training, was covered in the 
study. As a result of the depth of the study, agencies across the nation are able to recognize 
how unprepared they are. Even agencies that were not directly involved in the study can 
review the results and compare themselves to other agencies concerning their own 
preparedness levels. 
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A major weakness of the study is the low response rate. This could hinder the validity of 
the results. Also, the data analyzed here was collected in 1992, meaning that it was gathered 
before the Oklahoma City bombing and the pipe bomb explosion at Centennial Olympic Park. 
Because of the impact these two incidents had on the nation, responses may be somewhat 
different today. One of these incidents, the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, was the 
worst domestic terrorist attack in American history. An event like this can change views and 
the perception that Americans have on domestic terrorism. Therefore, what is now needed is a 
thorough follow up study in order to further assess this problem and the level of preparedness 
among agencies today. 
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